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Montgomery v. Airbus Helicopters, Inc.: Oklahoma’s 





Interstate and international commerce drive the economy.
1
 Consequently, 
many products travel a multistate or multinational distribution channel 
before reaching consumers.
2
 When these products injure a consumer, the 
consumer may want to seek a remedy in court. In order for the court to 
render a binding judgment over the manufacturers and distributors who may 
be responsible for the consumer’s injury, the manufacturers and distributors 
must be subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction.
3
  
There are several ways to establish personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident party: consent, service within the forum state, or through the 
party’s contacts with the forum state.
4
 The stream-of-commerce theory 
describes a particular contact capable of subjecting a party to a forum’s 
personal jurisdiction. When a party places its products into a distribution 
channel seeking to serve a state’s economy or consumers, the party is 




                                                                                                             
 * J.D. Candidate, University of Oklahoma College of Law, 2021. Special thank you to 
Professor Steven S. Gensler for his insight, guidance, and mentorship throughout this Note’s 
drafting. And thank you to Allyson Shumaker and Michael F. Waters for their conscientious 
editing of this Note. All errors, of course, are my own. 
 1. The United States imported over $2.5 trillion worth of goods in 2019. Consumer 
goods composed nearly $654 billion—over 25%—of imported goods. Press Release, Bureau 
of Econ. Analysis & U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. International Trade in Goods & Services: 
November 2020, at pt. A, exhibits 1, 6 (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/ 
files/2021-01/trad1120.pdf. 
 2. See Mihir Torsekar, Intermediate Goods Imports in Key U.S. Manufacturing 
Sectors, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, https://usitc.gov/research_and_analysis/ trade_shifts_ 
2017/specialtopic.htm#_ftnref28 (last visited Jan. 17, 2021) (discussing the proliferation of 
supply-chain globalization). 
 3. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999) (“[P]ersonal 
jurisdiction . . . is an ‘essential element of the jurisdiction of a district . . . court,’ without 
which the court is ‘powerless to proceed to an adjudication.’” (quoting Emps. Reinsurance 
Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U.S. 374, 382 (1937))). 
 4. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880–81 (2011) (plurality 
opinion) (explaining that if the defendant is not served in the forum state and does not 
consent, then due process requires that it “purposefully avail[] itself” to the forum state). 
 5. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297–98 (1980). 
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Before Montgomery v. Airbus Helicopters, Inc.,
6
 an Oklahoman injured 
by a product could rely on the stream-of-commerce theory to establish a 
manufacturer’s or distributor’s contact with Oklahoma. But in Montgomery, 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court ostensibly eliminated the stream-of-
commerce theory as a basis for establishing Oklahoma’s personal 
jurisdiction. With sparse explanation and questionable interpretations of 
recent U.S. Supreme Court cases, the court declared, “[S]tream of 




This Note will scrutinize Montgomery’s ostensible destruction of the 
stream-of-commerce theory and explain why the uncertainty Montgomery 
leaves behind is particularly troubling. Part II of this Note describes the 
stream-of-commerce theory’s development. Part III discusses 
Montgomery’s facts, analysis, and holding. Part IV examines Montgomery’s 
missteps and suggests two interpretations of the stream-of-commerce 
theory’s current status in Oklahoma. Then, Part V proposes two ways the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court can resolve Montgomery. Finally, Part VI 
encourages Oklahoma courts to interpret Montgomery narrowly. 
II. Development of the Stream-of-Commerce Theory  
Personal jurisdiction is a constitutional protection housed in the Due 
Process Clause.
8
 Due process requires that a party have certain ties or 
connections to a forum state as a prerequisite to the forum state’s power to 
render a binding judgment over it.
9
 These ties or connections may be 
established when a party creates contacts with, or reaches out to, the forum 
state.
10
 Contacts between a party and the forum state can create general 
                                                                                                             
 6. 2018 OK 17, 414 P.3d 824. 
 7. Id. ¶ 37, 414 P.3d at 834. 
 8. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1779 (2017) (“It 
has long been established that the Fourteenth Amendment limits the personal jurisdiction of 
state courts.”). 
 9. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283 (2014); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 
(“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law . . . .”). The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause generally controls both 
federal and state personal jurisdiction analyses because federal personal jurisdiction is 
predominantly coextensive with the state’s personal jurisdiction where the federal court is 
located. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (“Serving a summons or filing a waiver of service 
establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant . . . who is subject to the jurisdiction of a 
court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located . . . .”). 
 10. Walden, 571 U.S. at 284. 
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 or specific jurisdiction (“case-
linked jurisdiction”).
12
 Contacts-based specific jurisdiction has three 
distinct requirements: (1) the party reached out to the forum state, (2) the 
lawsuit “arise[s] out of or relate[s] to” that act, and (3) the forum’s exercise 
of personal jurisdiction would not be unfair or unreasonable.
13
  
The stream-of-commerce theory describes a particular way a party can 
reach out to the forum state, thereby subjecting it to the forum’s specific 
personal jurisdiction.
14
 This Note, accordingly, will focus on due process’s 
requirements for a forum to assert specific personal jurisdiction over a party 
based on that party’s contacts with the forum state. 
A. Emergence of Minimum Contacts 
Courts’ power to exercise personal jurisdiction was restricted initially to 
the territorial boundaries of the state where the court was located.
15
 Courts, 
consequently, could only exercise personal jurisdiction over people who 
were located within the state or who owned property there.
16
 But territorial 
personal jurisdiction quickly proved unworkable because courts needed 
more power to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents as interstate 
travel and commerce became commonplace.
17
 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington
18
 revolutionized courts’ ability to 
exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents by adding contacts as a 
                                                                                                             
 11. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) 
(explaining that general jurisdiction, or “all-purpose jurisdiction,” allows a court to hear any 
claim asserted against a party). 
 12. See id. (explaining that specific jurisdiction limits the court’s adjudicatory authority 
to claims connected to a party’s contacts with the forum state). 
 13. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 
117, 127 (2014)). 
 14. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 920 (holding that a stream-of-commerce contact cannot 
establish general personal jurisdiction). 
 15. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877) (“The authority of every tribunal is 
necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established.”).  
 16. See id. at 728 (explaining that a person must be served in the state or have his or her 
property attached to be subject to a court’s personal jurisdiction). 
 17. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250–51 (1958) (noting the need for personal 
jurisdiction over nonresidents due to “technological progress” and “increased . . . flow of 
commerce between States”); see also Michael Vitiello, Due Process and the Myth of 
Sovereignty, 50 U. PAC. L. REV. 513, 521 (2019) (attributing the expansion of states’ 
jurisdictional power to the “development of modern transportation”). 
 18. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
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basis for personal jurisdiction.
19
 International Shoe concluded that due 
process is satisfied when a court exercises personal jurisdiction over a party 
that has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.’”
20
 But the Court did not explain which acts constitute 
“minimum contacts” with the forum state. The Court instead suggested that 
the act’s “nature and quality and . . . circumstances” determined whether it 
was sufficient to subject a party to the forum’s personal jurisdiction.
21
 
These amorphous minimum-contacts guideposts led to a question the Court 
still grapples with today: which acts constitute minimum contacts with a 
forum state? 
The answer, under current law, is that minimum contacts requires a party 
to have reached out to the forum state attempting to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over it.
22
 When the Court established this requirement in 
Hanson v. Denckla,
23
 it explained that the minimum-contacts analysis 
centers on a party’s choice to reach out to the forum state.
24
 A party 
manifests this choice by “purposefully avail[ing] itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State.”
25
 A contact, in other words, is 
a party’s volitional act of reaching out to the forum state. 
There are many different ways a party can reach out to the forum state. 





 negotiations, and commercial interactions with the forum 
                                                                                                             
 19. See Adam N. Steinman, Access to Justice, Rationality, and Personal Jurisdiction, 
71 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1408 (2018) (noting that “International Shoe revolutionized the 
constitutional contours of personal jurisdiction” with its “new constitutional standard” of 
minimum contacts). 
 20. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 21. Id. at 318. 
 22. See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014) (explaining that due process 
limitations “principally protect the liberty of the nonresident defendant” and therefore the 
contact must be created by the “defendant himself”). 
 23. 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
 24. See Richard D. Freer, Justice Black Was Right About International Shoe, but for the 
Wrong Reason, 50 U. PAC. L. REV. 587, 593 (2019) (explaining that Hanson established that 
“there can be no personal jurisdiction without the defendant’s volitional engagement of the 
forum”). 
 25. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253. 
 26. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (noting that 
physical presence in the forum state is a contact between the party and the forum state). 
 27. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss3/5





 and circulating magazines in the forum state
29
 as acts of 
reaching out. Intentional torts, moreover, are considered acts of reaching 
out when a party’s tortious conduct targets the forum state and the party 
knows the brunt of the conduct’s effects will be felt there.
30
 Courts even 
accept overtly commercial internet activity as an act of reaching out.
31
 Soon 
after Hanson, courts began to recognize that placing products into the 
stream of commerce with the intent to serve the forum state’s market is an 
act of reaching out to that forum. 
B. Stream-of-Commerce Theory of Personal Jurisdiction 
The stream-of-commerce theory is the Illinois Supreme Court’s 
brainchild, introduced in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary 
Corp.
32
 In Gray, the court determined that Illinois could exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a nonresident party whose valves were used in an 
appliance that was sold to and then injured the plaintiff in Illinois.
33
 The 
court reasoned that if a party chooses to “sell its products for ultimate use in 
another State, it is not unjust to hold it answerable there for any damage 
caused by defects in those products” because the party presumably 
contemplated its products’ use in that state.
34
  
The stream-of-commerce theory was created to fill a gap in personal 
jurisdiction doctrine. The Illinois Supreme Court recognized that, by 
placing products into a distribution channel bound for Illinois, 
manufacturers and distributors could sell their products for ultimate use in 
Illinois without establishing contacts subjecting them to its personal 
jurisdiction.
35
 To close this gap, the court treated placing products into a 
distribution channel—the stream of commerce—as an act of reaching out to 
the state where the products are sold to consumers.
36
 
                                                                                                             
 28. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479–80. 
 29. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984). 
 30. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1984). 
 31. See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1125–26 
(W.D. Pa. 1997). 
 32. 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961). 
 33. Id. at 762, 767. 
 34. Id. at 766. 
 35. See id. (“[I]t should not matter that the purchase was made from an independent 
middleman or that someone other than the defendant shipped the product into this State.”). 
 36. See id. (“[T]he use of such products in the ordinary course of commerce is sufficient 
contact with this State to justify a requirement that [the party] defend here.”). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court first explored the stream-of-commerce theory in 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.
37
 There, an automobile retailer 
sold a car in New York to the plaintiffs, who then drove it into Oklahoma 
where they were injured in a car accident.
38
 Oklahoma could not exercise 
personal jurisdiction over the car’s retailer and wholesaler, the Court 
explained, because there was no act by which the defendants reached out to 
Oklahoma.
39
 The defendants had not solicited business from, advertised in, 
or sold cars to Oklahoma’s market.
40
 But if the defendants had been seeking 
to serve Oklahoma’s market, then subjecting them to Oklahoma’s personal 
jurisdiction would not have offended due process.
41
 World-Wide 
Volkswagen established that placing products into the stream of commerce 
with the intent to serve the forum state’s market is a contact capable of 
subjecting a party to the forum’s personal jurisdiction.  
The Court’s next stream-of-commerce discussion, in Asahi Metal 
Industry Co. v. Superior Court,
42
 generated two primary stream-of-
commerce tests: (1) stream of commerce “plus” and (2) “pure” stream of 
commerce.
43
 The difference between these tests centers on the acts that 
constitute reaching out to the forum state. 
Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion concluded that merely placing a 
product into a distribution channel does not constitute reaching out to the 
forum state.
44
 The plurality opinion’s stream-of-commerce-plus test instead 
required that the party place its products into a distribution channel and do 
“something more” demonstrating an intent to serve the forum state’s 
market.
45
 The “something more” could be specifically designing a product 
for the forum state’s market, advertising in the forum state, or establishing 
channels of communication with the forum state’s consumers.
46
 
                                                                                                             
 37. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
 38. Id. at 288, 299. 
 39. See id. at 295. 
 40. Id.  
 41. See id. at 297–98 (noting that due process is not offended if a forum asserts personal 
jurisdiction over a party who “delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the 
expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State” (citing Gray, 176 
N.E.2d at 766)). 
 42. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 43. Justice Stevens, however, advocated for a third test focused on the “the volume, the 
value, and the hazardous character of the [products].” Id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 44. Id. at 112 (plurality opinion). 
 45. Id. at 111–12. 
 46. Id. at 112. 
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Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion, in contrast, determined that a party 
reaches out to the forum state when there is a “regular and anticipated flow 
of products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale” and the party “is 
aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum State.”
47
 The 
concurring justices argued that a party placing its products into the stream 
of commerce in that manner ultimately benefits from that act.
48
 So it is not 
an undue burden to force it to litigate any harms resulting from that act in 
the state where the product was sold to consumers.
49
 
The Court’s next, and most recent, stream-of-commerce discussion took 
place in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,
50
 and it also failed to 
muster a consensus as to the acts required to establish a contact with the 
forum state. In McIntyre, an English manufacturer sold its metal-shearing 
machines to an American distributor, intending for those machines to be 
sold throughout the United States.
51
 One of its machines injured the 
plaintiff in New Jersey.
52
  
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion endorsed Justice O’Connor’s stream-
of-commerce-plus test and clarified that the party’s contact must be with 
the specific state attempting to exercise personal jurisdiction over it.
53
 For 
New Jersey to exercise personal jurisdiction over the manufacturer, 
therefore, its distribution scheme must have targeted New Jersey’s market 
or consumers.
54
 The plurality opinion concluded that New Jersey could not 
exercise personal jurisdiction over the manufacturer because the 
manufacturer’s distribution scheme targeted the United States as a whole—
not the State of New Jersey specifically.
55
 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion argued that New Jersey could 
exercise personal jurisdiction over the manufacturer because its nationwide 
distribution scheme was an act of reaching out to every state where its 
                                                                                                             
 47. Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. 564 U.S. 873 (2011). 
 51. Id. at 878, 886 (plurality opinion). 
 52. Id. at 878. 
 53. Id. at 884–85. 
 54. See id. at 884 (“The question is whether a defendant has followed a course of 
conduct directed at the society or economy existing within the jurisdiction of a given 
sovereign, so that the sovereign has the power to subject the defendant to judgment 
concerning that conduct.”).  
 55. Id. at 886–87. 
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machines were sold to consumers.
56
 The plurality opinion troubled the 
dissenting justices because under the plurality opinion’s analysis, a foreign 
manufacturer could evade personal jurisdiction in the United States simply 
by targeting the U.S. market as a whole.
57
  
Uncomfortable with the strong stances taken by the plurality opinion and 
the dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion determined that 
precedent alone decided this case.
58
 Justice O’Connor’s stream-of-
commerce-plus test was not satisfied because there was no additional 
conduct demonstrating the manufacturer’s intent to reach out to New 
Jersey’s market.
59
 Justice Brennan’s pure-stream-of-commerce test, 
moreover, was not satisfied because the few machines that had been sold in 




To this day, the Court has failed to agree on which acts establish that a 
party has reached out to a forum state in stream-of-commerce cases. Lower 
courts, unsurprisingly, are also split.
61
 Despite the chasm of disagreement 
among lower courts, the Oklahoma Supreme Court appears to be the only 
court to refuse to apply any stream-of-commerce test to establish personal 
jurisdiction over nonresidents.  
  
                                                                                                             
 56. See id. at 898, 905 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that New Jersey’s personal 
jurisdiction was proper because the product’s arrival in New Jersey was not “random[] or 
fortuitous[]”—it resulted from a “deliberat[e]” distribution scheme targeting every state). 
 57. See id. at 893. The plurality opinion did note, however, that Congress may have the 
ability to activate national contacts-based personal jurisdiction, which would authorize any 
federal court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign party based on the party’s 
contacts with the United States. See id. at 885 (plurality opinion). See generally William S. 
Dodge & Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aliens, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1205 (2018) 
(advocating for a “national-contacts approach” to establish personal jurisdiction over foreign 
parties).  
 58. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 887, 892–93 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 59. Id. at 888–89. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Compare Knox v. MetalForming, Inc., 914 F.3d 685, 691 (1st Cir. 2019) (treating 
Justice Breyer’s McIntyre concurrence as binding and noting agreement with the D.C. 
Circuit, Fifth Circuit, and Federal Circuit), with Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, PLC, 885 F.3d 
760, 780 (3d Cir. 2018) (rejecting the pure-stream-of-commerce test and explaining that the 
Third Circuit follows the Asahi and McIntyre pluralities’ stream-of-commerce-plus test), and 
Monge v. RG Petro-Mach. (Grp.) Co., 701 F.3d 598, 619–20 (10th Cir. 2012) (declining to 
choose between stream-of-commerce tests). 
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III. Montgomery v. Airbus Helicopters, Inc. 
A. Facts & Procedural History 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s dismissal of Montgomery v. Airbus 
Helicopters, Inc. for lack of personal jurisdiction hinged on the defendants’ 
contacts with Oklahoma.
62
 The case arose from an air-ambulance crash in 
Oklahoma City, which resulted in the deaths of two Oklahomans: the 
helicopter’s pilot and the flight nurse.
63
 Anke Montgomery (the pilot’s 
widow), EagleMed, L.L.C. (the air-ambulance service), and Starr Indemnity 
and Liability Co. (EagleMed’s insurer) brought tort claims in an Oklahoma 
court against Airbus Helicopters, Inc. (the helicopter’s vendor), Honeywell 
International, Inc. (the helicopter engine’s manufacturer), and Soloy, L.L.C. 
(the engine-conversion kit’s manufacturer).
64
 The plaintiffs alleged that a 
defect in the helicopter’s air-intake system had allowed ice to invade the 
compressor, leading to an engine flameout and subsequent crash.
65
  
Airbus and Soloy moved the court to dismiss the complaint for lack of 
personal jurisdiction, arguing that they had no contacts subjecting them to 
Oklahoma’s personal jurisdiction.
66
 Neither Airbus nor Soloy, they 
contended, had sought to do business in Oklahoma by reaching out to its 
market or consumers, including EagleMed’s air-ambulance base in 
Oklahoma.
67
 Airbus, indeed, had delivered the helicopter to EagleMed in 
Texas—not Oklahoma.
68
 And Airbus’s communications with EagleMed 
had been directed to EagleMed’s principal place of business in Kansas.
69
 
Soloy, similarly, had sent its engine-conversion kit to EagleMed’s principal 
place of business in Kansas.
70
 The plaintiffs argued that Oklahoma 
nonetheless could exercise personal jurisdiction over Airbus and Soloy 
because they had sold their products knowing that EagleMed would use 
                                                                                                             
 62. 2018 OK 17, ¶ 1, 414 P.3d 824, 825. 
 63. Id. ¶ 2, 414 P.3d at 825–26. 
 64. Id. ¶¶ 4, 11, 414 P.3d at 826–27. 
 65. Id. ¶ 3, 414 P.3d at 826. 
 66. Id. ¶¶ 12, 14, 414 P.3d at 827–28. Honeywell did not raise the defense of lack of 
personal jurisdiction, waiving the argument. Id. ¶ 12, 414 P.3d at 827.  
 67. Id. ¶ 14, 414 P.3d at 828. 
 68. Id. ¶ 5, 414 P.3d at 826. Airbus is a Delaware corporation, and its principal place of 
business is in Texas. Id. ¶ 4, 414 P.3d at 826. 
 69. Id. ¶ 9, 414 P.3d at 827. 
 70. Id. ¶ 7, 414 P.3d at 826. Soloy is a Washington corporation, and its principal place 
of business is in Washington. Id. ¶ 4, 414 P.3d at 826. 
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 The trial court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument and 
granted Airbus’s and Soloy’s motions to dismiss, holding that Oklahoma 
lacked personal jurisdiction over them.
72
 The Oklahoma Court of Civil 
Appeals affirmed, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari.
73
  
B. The Court’s Analysis & Decision  
The issue before the Oklahoma Supreme Court was whether Airbus and 
Soloy had established contacts subjecting them to Oklahoma’s personal 
jurisdiction.
74
 The court immediately took general personal jurisdiction off 
the table because neither defendant was incorporated in Oklahoma nor 
maintained its principal place of business there.
75
 Then, the court set forth 
the requirements for an Oklahoma court to exercise specific personal 
jurisdiction: (1) the defendant “purposefully directed activities” at 
Oklahoma, (2) the claims “arise out of or relate to those activities,” and (3) 
exercising jurisdiction would not be unreasonable or “offend the traditional 
notions of substantial justice and fair play.”
76
 Because Oklahoma’s long-
arm statute is coextensive with the Due Process Clause’s limitations on 
personal jurisdiction, the court evaluated these requirements through the 
lens of the Due Process Clause.
77
 
The court began its analysis by recounting two recent U.S. Supreme 
Court cases: Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court and Walden v. 
Fiore.
78
 Bristol-Myers, the court noted, held that personal jurisdiction may 
                                                                                                             
 71. Id. ¶¶ 8, 14, 414 P.3d at 826, 828.  
 72. Id. ¶ 13, 414 P.3d at 828. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. ¶ 1, 414 P.3d at 825. 
 75. Id. ¶¶ 4, 16, 414 P.3d at 826, 828–29. A corporation is subject to a forum’s general 
jurisdiction when its affiliations with the forum state are “so ‘continuous and systematic’ as 
to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 
127 (2014) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 
(2011)). A corporation is considered “at home” in its state of incorporation and in its 
principal place of business. Id. at 137 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924). 
 76. Montgomery, ¶ 16, 414 P.3d at 829. 
 77. Id. ¶ 18, 414 P.3d at 829; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”); 12 
OKLA. STAT. § 2004(F) (Supp. 2018) (“A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any 
basis consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United 
States.”). 
 78. Montgomery, ¶¶ 19–26, 414 P.3d at 829–31 (first discussing Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017); and then discussing Walden v. Fiore, 571 
U.S. 277 (2014)). 
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be exercised consistent with the Due Process Clause only when the 
defendant’s contacts with the forum state are connected to the particular 
claims asserted against it.
79
 The court concluded that Bristol-Myers required 
it to overturn its precedents approving of personal jurisdiction under the 
“totality of the contacts” and “stream of commerce” approaches, which 
lacked an explicit connection requirement.
80
 The court then observed that 
Walden had concluded that a defendant’s relationship with a third party, 
standing alone, does not subject it to a forum’s personal jurisdiction.
81
 
Airbus’s and Soloy’s relationship with EagleMed, therefore, did not subject 
them to Oklahoma’s personal jurisdiction.
82
 Similarly, the court explained, 
a plaintiff’s unilateral activity in the forum state does not subject the 
defendant to that forum’s personal jurisdiction.
83
 EagleMed’s unilateral 
decision to operate the helicopter in Oklahoma, therefore, did not subject 
Airbus or Soloy to Oklahoma’s personal jurisdiction.
84
  
After discussing Oklahoma’s “stream of commerce” approach, which 
this Note explains in detail below,
85
 the court briefly discussed the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s similarly titled stream-of-commerce theory.
86
 Because the 
Court had not discussed the stream-of-commerce theory in Bristol-Myers or 
Walden, those cases, the court concluded, “presumptively, at least 
implicitly, reject[ed] such analysis.”
87
 Conflating Oklahoma’s “stream of 
commerce” approach with the similarly titled—but completely different—
stream-of-commerce theory, the court viewed them both as “stream of 
commerce” analyses and declared, “[S]tream of commerce is no longer the 
analysis this [c]ourt will use to determine specific personal jurisdiction.”
88
 
The court also, without further explanation, cited two cases remanded in 
light of Bristol-Myers as supporting its conclusion.
89
 The court then 
                                                                                                             
 79. Id. ¶ 22, 414 P.3d at 830. 
 80. See id. ¶ 36, 414 P.3d at 833. 
 81. Id. ¶ 26, 414 P.3d at 830–31. 
 82. Id. ¶ 36, 414 P.3d at 833. 
 83. Id. ¶ 36, 414 P.3d at 834. 
 84. Id.  
 85. See infra Section IV.B.1.  
 86. Montgomery, ¶¶ 32–35, 414 P.3d at 832–33. 
 87. Id. ¶ 27, 414 P.3d at 831. 
 88. Id. ¶ 37, 414 P.3d at 834 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 89. Id. ¶ 36, 414 P.3d at 834 (first citing Murco Wall Prods., Inc. v. Galier, 138 S. Ct. 
982 (2018) (mem.); and then citing Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Lawson, 138 S. Ct. 
237 (2017) (mem.)). 
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IV. Montgomery Was Right Until It Went Wrong 
Part IV sets forth Montgomery’s missteps and advances two 
interpretations of the stream-of-commerce theory’s current status in 
Oklahoma. Section IV.A addresses what Montgomery got right: it 
recognized that Bristol-Myers abrogated Oklahoma’s “totality of the 
contacts” personal jurisdiction approach. Section IV.B explains where 
Montgomery went wrong: in overturning Oklahoma’s “stream of 
commerce” approach, it conflated that approach with the stream-of-
commerce theory used throughout the rest of the United States. The court, 
therefore, inadvertently eliminated any use of stream of commerce to 
establish personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma. 
A. Bristol-Myers Abrogated Oklahoma’s “Totality of the Contacts” 
Approach 
Montgomery correctly concluded that Bristol-Myers had abrogated 
Oklahoma’s “totality of the contacts” approach to specific personal 
jurisdiction.
91
 Bristol-Myers clarified that specific personal jurisdiction does 
not exist unless a defendant’s contacts with the forum state are connected to 
the claims the plaintiff asserts against it.
92
 Bristol-Myers, accordingly, 
rejected California’s “sliding scale” approach, which allowed the 
connection requirement of specific personal jurisdiction to be satisfied by a 
defendant’s wide-ranging contacts with the forum state even when they 
were unrelated to the underlying controversy.
93
 The Court explained that 
this type of analysis is not consistent with due process because it 
“resembles a loose and spurious form of general jurisdiction.”
94
 
Similar to California’s “sliding scale” approach, Oklahoma’s “totality of 
the contacts” approach did not require a connection between the 
                                                                                                             
 90. Id. ¶ 38, 414 P.3d at 834. 
 91. Id. ¶ 27, 414 P.3d at 831. 
 92. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) (“What is 
needed—and what is missing here—is a connection between the forum and the specific 
claims at issue.”). 
 93. See id. (“Under the [sliding-scale] approach, the strength of the requisite connection 
between the forum and the specific claims at issue is relaxed if the defendant has extensive 
forum contacts that are unrelated to those claims.”). 
 94. Id.  
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defendant’s contacts with the forum state and the claims asserted against 
it.
95
 In Hough v. Leonard, for example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
upheld personal jurisdiction over nonresident oil-well investors in a fee-
agreement dispute despite the fact that “each individual contact made by the 
nonresidents may not be sufficient standing alone to maintain[] minimum 
contacts.”
96
 The court determined that the investors nonetheless were 
subject to Oklahoma’s personal jurisdiction because one of them had 
unrelated leasehold interests in Oklahoma and they had reached out to other 
Oklahomans regarding the same well.
97
 In other words, the court exercised 
personal jurisdiction based on the investors’ wide-ranging, unrelated 
contacts with Oklahoma.
98
 Hough illustrates that Montgomery correctly 
abrogated the “totality of the contacts” approach because it did not adhere 
to due process’s requirement that the defendant’s contacts with the forum 
state must be connected to the particular claims asserted against it.  
B. Montgomery Mishandled the Stream-of-Commerce Theory 
Although Montgomery correctly overturned Oklahoma’s “totality of the 
contacts” approach,
99
 it mistakenly rejected any use of stream of commerce 
to establish personal jurisdiction. First, Section IV.B.1 explains that the 
widely used stream-of-commerce theory and Oklahoma’s “stream of 
commerce” approach are completely different. Second, Section IV.B.2 
                                                                                                             
 95. See, e.g., Guffey v. Ostonakulov, 2014 OK 6, ¶ 26, 321 P.3d 971, 980 (“The totality 
of [d]efendant’s contacts with Oklahoma constitute more than sufficient minimum contacts 
for the exercise of [personal] jurisdiction to be reasonable . . . .”); Hough v. Leonard, 1993 
OK 112, ¶ 13, 867 P.2d 438, 444 (“While each individual contact made by the nonresidents 
may not be sufficient standing alone to maintain[] minimum contacts, the totality of the 
contacts [is] sufficient to exercise personal jurisdiction over the non-residents.”). 
 96. Hough, ¶ 13, 867 P.2d at 444. 
 97. Id. The court also observed that the defendants had entered into a contract over the 
phone with an Oklahoma company that then hired the plaintiff as a subcontractor. Id. But the 
court seemed to think that the identity of the party that initiated that phone call was 
irrelevant. Id. (“Regardless of who initiated the contact, the non-residents could have refused 
to enter into a contract and thereby alleviated the risk of defending a suit commenced in 
Oklahoma.”). A contract alone, however, does not automatically establish minimum contacts 
with the forum state. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478 (1985). The 
essential questions that needed to be asked and answered were (1) what acts led to and 
flowed from entering into the contract and (2) did those acts constitute reaching out to the 
forum state. See id. at 479–80. 
 98. See Hough, ¶ 13, 867 P.2d at 444 (“[T]he totality of the contacts [is] sufficient to 
exercise personal jurisdiction over the non-residents.”). 
 99. See supra Section IV.A. 
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demonstrates that the authority Montgomery relied on does not support 
rejecting the widely used stream-of-commerce theory. Third, Section 
IV.B.3 observes that Montgomery’s stream-of-commerce discussion was 
unnecessary—and, thus, dictum—because Montgomery was not a stream-
of-commerce case. Finally, Section IV.B.4 suggests that Montgomery 
conflated Oklahoma’s “stream of commerce” approach with the stream-of-
commerce theory, resulting in the latter’s inadvertent demise. 
1. Stream-of-Commerce Theory v. Oklahoma’s “Stream of Commerce” 
Approach 
The stream-of-commerce theory is different from Oklahoma’s “stream of 
commerce” approach. The stream-of-commerce theory describes one way a 
party can reach out to a state. The theory explains that a party reaches out to 
a state when it places its products in a distribution channel with the intent to 
serve the state’s market.
100
 The stream-of-commerce theory, in other words, 
is merely a means of establishing that a party has reached out to the forum 
state. It does not satisfy the separate connection requirement or fairness 
requirement for exercising specific personal jurisdiction.
101
 
Oklahoma’s “stream of commerce” approach, by contrast, is a 
comprehensive personal jurisdiction analysis that sets forth when an 
Oklahoma court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a party—
not merely when a party has reached out to Oklahoma. This approach 
worked similarly to Oklahoma’s “totality of the contacts” approach because 
it did not require a connection between the defendant’s act of placing its 
products into the stream of commerce and the particular claims asserted 
against it.
102
 Indeed, Oklahoma’s “stream of commerce” approach simply 
looked to whether the products arrived in Oklahoma as a result of the 
defendant’s purposeful acts and whether exercising jurisdiction over the 
defendant would be fair.
103
 Similar to Oklahoma’s “totality of the contacts” 
                                                                                                             
 100. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 881–82 (2011) (plurality 
opinion); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297–98 (1980). 
 101. See, e.g., Align Corp. v. Boustred, 421 P.3d 163, 172–73 (Colo. 2017) (affirming 
personal jurisdiction over Align because Align placed goods into the stream of commerce, 
the plaintiff’s injuries arose out of that act, and asserting personal jurisdiction over Align is 
not unfair). 
 102. See Montgomery v. Airbus Helicopters, Inc., 2018 OK 17, ¶ 27, 414 P.3d 824, 831 
(noting that the court’s precedents using the “totality of contacts” and “stream of commerce” 
approaches worked similarly to the “sliding scale” approach rejected in Bristol-Myers). 
 103. State ex rel. Edmondson v. Native Wholesale Supply, 2010 OK 58, ¶¶ 25–26, 237 
P.3d 199, 209. 
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approach and California’s “sliding scale” approach, this approach did not 
survive Bristol-Myers because it did not require a connection between a 
defendant’s contacts with the forum state and the particular claims asserted 
against it. 
In sum, the stream-of-commerce theory is a way to establish that a party 
has reached out to the forum state. Oklahoma’s “stream of commerce” 
approach, by contrast, is a comprehensive personal jurisdiction analysis that 
was abrogated by Bristol-Myers because it did not require a connection 
between a defendant’s act of reaching out to the forum state and the 
particular claims asserted against it. Though the court correctly overturned 
this approach in light of Bristol-Myers, it wrongly relied on Bristol-Myers 
and other caselaw to do away with the widely used stream-of-commerce 
theory as well. 
2. Walden and Bristol-Myers Did Not Affect the Stream-of-Commerce 
Theory 
Despite the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s conclusion that the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s silence in Walden and Bristol-Myers as to the stream-of-
commerce theory amounted to “presumptively, at least implicitly, rejecting 
such analysis,”
104
 neither case’s facts called for the stream-of-commerce 
theory to establish each defendant’s contact with the forum state. Walden 
involved Nevada plaintiffs suing a Georgia defendant in a Nevada court 
based on his alleged violation of their Fourth Amendment rights and his 
filing of a false affidavit in connection with seizing their cash.
105
 The 
predicate facts for application of the stream-of-commerce theory—i.e., a 
product, a manufacturer, or a distributor—were not present. Bristol-Myers, 
similarly, presented no need to use the stream-of-commerce theory because 
the parties agreed that the defendant had extensive, direct contacts with the 
forum state (California).
106
 The defendant, indeed, maintained five research 
and laboratory facilities and employed over 400 people in California.
107
 The 
Court’s silence in those cases, therefore, was just silence. 
                                                                                                             
 104. Montgomery, ¶ 27, 414 P.3d at 831. 
 105. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 280–81 (2014). 
 106. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1778 (2017) 
(“Five of [the defendant’s] research and laboratory facilities, which employ a total of around 
160 employees, are located there. . . . [The defendant] also employs about 250 sales 
representatives in [the forum] and maintains a small state-government advocacy office in 
[the forum].”). 
 107. Id.  
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Although Bristol-Myers did not discuss the stream-of-commerce theory, 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court was not alone in thinking that Bristol-Myers 
had impacted it.
108
 In Bristol-Myers, over 600 plaintiffs—most of whom 
were not California residents—brought state-law claims against the 
defendant based on injuries allegedly caused by one of its pharmaceutical 
drugs.
109
 Confronted with a motion to quash service of summons for lack of 
personal jurisdiction,
110
 the plaintiffs raised a last-ditch argument that the 
defendant’s decision to contract with a California distributor for its national 
distribution scheme subjected it to California’s personal jurisdiction in this 
case.
111
 But there was no evidence “[the defendant] engaged in relevant acts 
together with [the distributor] in California” and no evidence showing “how 
or by whom [the product] [the plaintiffs] took was distributed to the 
pharmacies that dispensed it to them.”
112
 The plaintiffs’ stream-of-
commerce argument, in other words, failed due process’s connection 
requirement because the plaintiffs did not show the drugs that had caused 
their injuries were distributed to their pharmacies by the defendant’s 
California distributor. The Court, indeed, implied that if the plaintiffs could 
prove that the drugs they had taken had been distributed to their pharmacies 
by the defendant’s California distributor, then the defendant’s acts leading 
to and flowing from its contract with that distributor might have subjected it 
                                                                                                             
 108. See, e.g., Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, PLC, 885 F.3d 760, 780 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(differentiating between the pure-stream-of-commerce test and the court’s “deliberate 
targeting of the forum” requirement—which is essentially the Asahi plurality’s stream-of-
commerce-plus test—and suggesting that Bristol-Myers rejected the pure-stream-of-
commerce test); Richard A. Dean & Katya S. Cronin, Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior 
Court: The Last Nail in the Coffin of Stream-of-Commerce Personal Jurisdiction, FOR DEF., 
Jan. 2018, at 22, 25, https://www.tuckerellis.com/webfiles/FTD-1801-Dean-Cronin.pdf 
(arguing Bristol-Myers “dea[lt] a fatal blow to the refrain that the new economic realities of 
globalization mean that a company with a national distribution network can be sued in any 
state”). 
 109. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1777.  
 110. Id. at 1778.   
 111. Id. at 1783 (“In a last ditch contention, respondents contend that [Bristol-Myers’] 
‘decision to contract with a California company [McKesson] to distribute [Plavix] 
nationally’ provides a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction.” (citing Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 32, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (No. 
16-466))). 
 112. Id. (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 377 P.3d 874, 895 (Cal. 
2016) (Werdegar, J., dissenting)). 
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to California’s personal jurisdiction in this case.
113
 Bristol-Myers, therefore, 
did not impact the stream-of-commerce theory: it simply tells us that—as 
with all contacts—stream-of-commerce contacts must be connected to the 
claims asserted against the defendant. 
Furthermore, the other authorities the Oklahoma Supreme Court cited in 
support of its decision, Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Lawson
114
 and 
Murco Wall Products, Inc. v. Galier,
115
 were remanded by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in light of Bristol-Myers
116
 because of their improper 
connection analyses—not their contacts analyses. In Lawson I, the 
Arkansas Court of Appeals analyzed “whether the defendant’s conduct 
connects him to the forum in a meaningful way” and upheld personal 
jurisdiction even though “the relation of the cause of action to the contacts 
is weak.”
117
 On remand, the Lawson II court agreed that its connection 
analysis in Lawson I was improper and dismissed for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.
118
 Similar to Lawson I, in Galier the Oklahoma Court of Civil 
Appeals conducted a “totality of the contacts” analysis and concluded that 
personal jurisdiction was proper without analyzing whether the defendant’s 
contacts were connected to the claims the plaintiff had asserted against it.
119
 
Both Lawson and Galier were remanded to remedy connection defects, not 
contacts defects. Neither, therefore, supports rejecting the stream-of-
commerce theory.  
3. Montgomery Was Not a Stream-of-Commerce Case 
There was no need for Montgomery to discuss—let alone abrogate—the 
stream-of-commerce theory to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of 
personal jurisdiction. It instead should have simply rejected the plaintiffs’ 
so-called stream-of-commerce argument as applied to the facts of the case. 
The plaintiffs had argued that Airbus and Soloy were both subject to 
Oklahoma’s personal jurisdiction through the stream-of-commerce theory 
                                                                                                             
 113. Id. (implying that evidence of connection between the defendant’s act of contracting 
with a forum distributor for its national distribution scheme and the claims asserted against it 
may have impacted the Court’s analysis). 
 114. 511 S.W.3d 883 (Ark. Ct. App. 2017). 
 115. No. 114,175 (Okla. Civ. App. Feb. 3, 2017) (unpublished). 
 116. Murco Wall Prods., Inc. v. Galier, 138 S. Ct. 982 (2018) (mem.); Simmons Sporting 
Goods, Inc. v. Lawson, 138 S. Ct. 237 (2017) (mem.).  
 117. Lawson, 511 S.W.3d at 887–88. 
 118. Lawson v. Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc., 553 S.W.3d 190, 195–96 (Ark. Ct. App. 
2018), aff’d, 569 S.W.3d 865 (Ark. 2019). 
 119. Galier, No. 114,175, ¶¶ 44–46. 
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because they knew that EagleMed would use the helicopter in Oklahoma.
120
 
But there were no stream-of-commerce contacts with Oklahoma because 
neither Airbus nor Soloy participated in a distribution channel that resulted 
in their products’ sale there.
121
 Indeed, the helicopter ended up in Oklahoma 
only because EagleMed unilaterally chose to fly it there.
122
 This was 
insufficient to sustain personal jurisdiction under longstanding U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent. Recall that in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, the plaintiffs drove their car into Oklahoma after purchasing it in 
New York.
123
 Even though it was “foreseeable that the purchasers of 
automobiles . . . may take [cars] to Oklahoma,” the Court nonetheless 
concluded that a consumer’s unilateral act of taking a product into the 
forum state does not subject defendants up the distribution chain to that 
forum’s personal jurisdiction through the stream-of-commerce theory.
124
 
The Montgomery court, therefore, should have affirmed the dismissal for 
lack of personal jurisdiction by simply adhering to World-Wide 
Volkswagen: mere knowledge that EagleMed would unilaterally choose to 
take the helicopter into Oklahoma after the point of sale did not subject 
Airbus and Soloy to Oklahoma’s personal jurisdiction through the stream-
of-commerce theory. 
4. The Source of Montgomery’s Missteps 
Montgomery’s missteps can be attributed to its conflation of Oklahoma’s 
“stream of commerce” approach with the stream-of-commerce theory. As 
discussed above, Bristol-Myers abrogated Oklahoma’s “stream of 
commerce” approach but had no impact on the stream-of-commerce theory 
widely used throughout the rest of the United States to establish that a party 
has reached out to the forum state.
125
 Conflating these distinct concepts and 
blending them into an undifferentiated “stream of commerce” analysis 
                                                                                                             
 120. Montgomery v. Airbus Helicopters, Inc., 2018 OK 17, ¶¶ 8, 14, 414 P.3d 824, 826, 
828.  
 121. The court noted that the only contacts between EagleMed, Airbus, and Soloy 
occurred in Texas and Kansas. Id. ¶ 30, 414 P.3d at 832. 
 122. Id. ¶ 36, 414 P.3d at 834. 
 123. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288 (1980). See also 
supra Section II.B. 
 124. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S at 298. 
 125. See supra Sections IV.B.1–2. 
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resulted in language ostensibly eliminating any use of stream of commerce 
to establish personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma.
126
 
Although Montgomery repeatedly rejected any use of stream of 
commerce, its concluding paragraph contradicts those statements by 
indicating that the stream-of-commerce theory is still viable in Oklahoma. 
Montgomery’s final paragraph concludes that Oklahoma lacked personal 
jurisdiction over the defendants because they did not engage in any 
quintessential stream-of-commerce contacts with Oklahoma.
127
 The court 
observed that the defendants “did not aim [their] products at the Oklahoma 
markets . . . [or] solicit business from Oklahoma markets and Oklahoma 




The Oklahoma Supreme Court arguably still recognizes the 
constitutional validity of the stream-of-commerce theory because 
Montgomery’s final paragraph mentioned stream-of-commerce contacts that 
a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court in both Asahi and McIntyre had listed 
as capable of satisfying due process requirements.
129
 The court stated that 
the defendants had not established minimum contacts with Oklahoma 
because these quintessential stream-of-commerce contacts were not 
present.
130
 Montgomery’s concluding paragraph, therefore, can be 
interpreted as preserving the stream-of-commerce theory as a basis for 
establishing Oklahoma’s personal jurisdiction in fact patterns where the 
plaintiff can prove that these quintessential stream-of-commerce contacts 
exist. 
  
                                                                                                             
 126. See Montgomery, ¶ 37, 414 P.3d at 834 (“[S]tream of commerce is no longer the 
analysis this [c]ourt will use to determine specific personal jurisdiction.”); id. ¶ 27, 414 P.3d 
at 831 (asserting that the omission of stream-of-commerce analysis in Walden and Bristol-
Myers amounted to “presumptively, at least implicitly, rejecting such analysis”); id. ¶ 36, 
414 P.3d at 833 (concluding that no stream-of-commerce test can establish Oklahoma’s 
personal jurisdiction). 
 127. See id. ¶ 38, 414 P.3d at 834. 
 128. Id. (emphasis added). 
 129. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 882 (2011) (plurality 
opinion) (explaining that the stream-of-commerce theory is satisfied when the “defendant 
can be said to have targeted the forum”); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 
102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion) (stating that a product’s placement into the stream of 
commerce plus “solicit[ing] business in [the forum state]” satisfies due process). 
 130. See Montgomery, ¶ 38, 414 P.3d at 834. 
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V. Resolving Montgomery 
Despite there being room to argue that Montgomery only eliminated 
Oklahoma’s “stream of commerce” approach, Montgomery has been 
uniformly interpreted as eliminating stream of commerce entirely.
131
 The 
Western District of Oklahoma, for example, observed that Montgomery 
“impl[ies] that any stream-of-commerce approach was abrogated by the 
[Bristol-Myers] decision.”
132
 Moving forward, the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court has two options to resolve Montgomery’s contradictory treatment of 
the stream-of-commerce theory: (1) clarify that Montgomery rejected only 
Oklahoma’s “stream of commerce” approach; or (2) explain that 
Montgomery also rejected the stream-of-commerce theory but did so for 
Oklahoma-specific reasons.  
The court can resolve Montgomery’s internal contradiction by clarifying 
that when Montgomery discussed and rejected stream of commerce, it was 
referring to Oklahoma’s “stream of commerce” approach. Montgomery, 
therefore, abrogated only Oklahoma’s “stream of commerce” approach 
without impacting the stream-of-commerce theory. If the court intended to 
preserve the stream-of-commerce theory as a basis for Oklahoma’s personal 
jurisdiction, then it must make that clear. Otherwise, Montgomery will 
likely continue to be read as eliminating any use of stream of commerce.
133
  
Alternatively, the court could explain that its decision to eliminate the 
stream-of-commerce theory was tied to its interpretation of the Oklahoma 
Constitution. Recall that Oklahoma’s long-arm statute is coextensive with 
the limits of the U.S. Constitution and Oklahoma’s Constitution.
134
 Federal 
                                                                                                             
 131. See Cagle v. Rexon Indus. Corp., No. CIV-18-1209-R, 2019 WL 1960360, at *8 
(W.D. Okla. May 2, 2019); James M. Beck, Another Domino Teetering–Stream of 
Commerce Personal Jurisdiction After BMS, DRUG & DEVICE L. BLOG (Mar. 12, 2018), 
https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2018/03/another-domino-teetering-stream-of-
commerce-personal-jurisdiction-after-bms.html; Gary Isaac, Oklahoma High Court Rejects 
“Stream of Commerce” Doctrine as Basis for Specific Jurisdiction, WASH. LEGAL FOUND. 
(July 27, 2018), https://www.wlf.org/2018/07/27/wlf-legal-pulse/oklahoma-high-court-
rejects-stream-of-commerce-doctrine-as-basis-for-specific-jurisdiction/; Steven L. Boldt, 
The Death of Stream of Commerce in Aviation Litigation, AM. BAR ASS’N (Oct. 24, 2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/mass-torts/practice/2018/the-
death-of-stream-of-commerce-in-aviation-litigation/. 
 132. Cagle, 2019 WL 1960360, at *8.  
 133. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 134. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2004(F) (Supp. 2018) (“A court of this state may exercise 
jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of 
the United States.”). See also supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
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due process limits a state’s power to assert personal jurisdiction.
135
 But a 
state, like Oklahoma, can choose to impose due process requirements on its 
courts above and beyond what the U.S. Constitution provides.
136
  
If the court intended to eliminate the stream-of-commerce theory, then it 
must justify this choice with reasons tied to the Oklahoma Constitution. 
Montgomery ostensibly eliminated the stream-of-commerce theory under 
the guise of adhering to the U.S. Constitution’s due process requirements as 
set forth in Bristol-Myers.
137
 But as discussed above, Bristol-Myers was not 
a stream-of-commerce case, and it did not impact the stream-of-commerce 
theory.
138
 The Oklahoma Supreme Court may impose additional limits on 
Oklahoma courts’ ability to exercise personal jurisdiction by eliminating 
the stream-of-commerce theory, but it must provide an explanation tied to 
the Oklahoma Constitution.  
VI. Oklahoma Courts Should Interpret Montgomery Narrowly 
Montgomery can be—and should be—interpreted as overturning only 
Oklahoma’s “totality of the contacts” and “stream of commerce” 
approaches to personal jurisdiction. As for Montgomery’s repetitious 
rejections of stream of commerce generally, Oklahoma courts should 
recognize these statements for what they are: dicta. By interpreting 
Montgomery narrowly, the only change to Oklahoma’s personal jurisdiction 
doctrine will be that Oklahoma courts will no longer evaluate whether they 
have personal jurisdiction based on an analysis that falls short of due 
process by failing to require a connection between the defendant’s contacts 
with Oklahoma and the claims asserted against it.  
Interpreting Montgomery narrowly, moreover, would preserve the 
stream-of-commerce theory as a basis for establishing Oklahoma’s personal 
jurisdiction. Montgomery’s contradictory treatment of the stream-of-
commerce theory calls the theory into question, but there is no reason to 
deny Oklahoma plaintiffs this avenue for establishing Oklahoma’s personal 
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants until the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
                                                                                                             
 135. See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283 (2014) (“The Due Process Clause . . . 
constrains a State’s authority to bind a nonresident defendant to a judgment of its courts.”). 
 136. See, e.g., Friedman v. Bloomberg L.P., 884 F.3d 83, 91 n.6 (2d Cir. 2017) (“Federal 
due process . . . does not compel a state to provide for jurisdiction . . . . [It, instead,] limits 
the extent to which a state court may exercise jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 137. See Montgomery v. Airbus Helicopters, Inc., 2018 OK 17, ¶ 36, 414 P.3d 824, 833. 
 138. See supra Section IV.B.2. 
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definitively tells us how Montgomery impacted the stream-of-commerce 
theory.  
By broadly reading Montgomery’s rejections of stream of commerce, 
Oklahoma courts would deprive Oklahoma plaintiffs of the ability to bring 
certain products-liability lawsuits in Oklahoma courts and leave an 
exploitable gap in Oklahoma’s personal jurisdiction doctrine. The stream-
of-commerce theory came about as a solution to situations where the only 
contact a manufacturer or distributor had with the forum state was placing 
its products into a distribution channel seeking to serve that state’s 
market.
139
 A decade ago, in State ex rel. Edmondson v. Native Wholesale 
Supply, the Oklahoma Supreme Court aptly explained the stream-of-
commerce theory’s importance: Without the stream-of-commerce theory, 
actors up the distribution channel could “engag[e] in carefully structured 
transactions that ostensibly take place outside of the State,” allowing actors 
to “purposefully . . . target [a product] at Oklahoma,” “reap[] the economic 
benefits,” and “evad[e]” Oklahoma’s personal jurisdiction.
140
  
Edmondson elucidates the consequences of interpreting Montgomery 
broadly. In Edmondson, Native Wholesale Supply
141
 sold more than 100 
million cigarettes over a fifteen-month period to a Muscogee Creek Nation 
retailer, which then sold the cigarettes to Muscogee Creek Nation’s market 
and Oklahoma’s market.
142
 Native Wholesale Supply argued it was not 
subject to Oklahoma’s personal jurisdiction because it was targeting only 
the Muscogee Creek Nation’s market.
143
 But the court found this claim 
“disingenuous” because Muscogee Creek Nation’s cigarette demand was 
such a small fraction of the total number of cigarettes sold that the 
cigarettes’ “ultimate destination” could only be Oklahoma’s market.
144
 
Native Wholesale Supply, therefore, had deliberately targeted Oklahoma’s 
market through its cigarette-distribution scheme.
145
 And this was Native 
                                                                                                             
 139. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297–98 (1980). 
 140. 2010 OK 58, ¶ 27, 237 P.3d 199, 209. 
 141. Native Wholesale Supply is a Sac and Fox Nation chartered corporation with its 
principal place of business in Seneca Nation. Id. ¶ 33, 237 P.3d at 210–11. 
 142. Id. ¶¶ 20–21, 237 P.3d at 208. Although Muscogee Creek Nation is located within 
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Oklahoma because contacts are analyzed “sovereign by sovereign.” See J. McIntyre Mach., 
Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011) (plurality opinion). 
 143. Edmondson, ¶ 22, 237 P.3d at 208.  
 144. Id. ¶¶ 21, 23–24, 237 P.3d at 208. 
 145. See id. ¶ 23, 237 P.3d at 208. 
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Wholesale Supply’s only contact with Oklahoma.
146
 Without the stream-of-
commerce theory, Native Wholesale Supply would have successfully 
evaded Oklahoma’s personal jurisdiction by funneling its cigarettes into 
Oklahoma through a nonresident intermediary. 
Interpreting Montgomery broadly would open the door to manufacturers 
and distributors deliberately targeting Oklahoma’s market, causing injury to 
Oklahomans, and escaping answering for their products’ harms in 
Oklahoma courts by simply placing a nonresident intermediary between 
themselves and Oklahoma. Oklahoma courts, until instructed otherwise, 
should interpret Montgomery narrowly to allow Oklahoma plaintiffs to use 
the stream-of-commerce theory as a means of establishing that nonresident 
manufacturers and distributors have reached out to Oklahoma.  
VII. Conclusion 
The stream-of-commerce theory’s status in Oklahoma matters. 
Oklahoma imported over $7.5 billion worth of manufactured consumer 
goods in 2019.
147
 Thus, litigation involving products manufactured by 
nonresidents is inevitable.  
Oklahoma plaintiffs, nonresident manufacturers and distributors, 
lawyers, and judges need a clear explanation of Montgomery’s impact on 
the stream-of-commerce theory. Montgomery’s contradictory treatment of 
the stream-of-commerce theory and sparse explanation for its seemingly 
radical change to Oklahoma’s personal jurisdiction doctrine beg the 
question of whether the Oklahoma Supreme Court actually intended to 
eliminate the stream-of-commerce theory. Without guidance from the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court, Oklahoma courts will wade through murky 
waters struggling to piece together Montgomery’s ostensible destruction of 
stream-of-commerce personal jurisdiction. 
 
Morgan E. Vastag 
 
                                                                                                             
 146. See id. ¶¶ 19–20, 237 P.3d at 207–08 (discussing only Native Wholesale Supply’s 
transactions with the Muscogee Creek Nation retailer). 
 147. Press Release, Bureau of Econ. Analysis & U.S. Census Bureau, Monthly U.S. 
International Trade in Goods and Services, December 2019, Supplement at exhibit 2a (Feb. 
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